words had been tried by ecclesiastical courts for the offense of heresy. Taylor had spoken these words at the same time as the House of Lords was considering legislating against "Atheism, Prophaneness and Blasphemy." 3 Likely because of this, Taylor did not go directly to an ecclesiastical court to face trial, but came before the Lords to determine in which jurisdiction he should be tried. On the advice of the judiciary-the judges of the three highest common law courts, King's Bench, the Court of Common Pleas, and the Exchequer-Taylor was sent for trial in King's Bench. 4 There, Taylor was tried and convicted for the common law offense of defamation by a bench consisting of Justices Thomas Twisden, Richard
Taylor's Case has enjoyed notoriety for over three centuries. It was cited as precedent, for example, in a range of high profile cases, including Thomas Williams's 1797 blasphemy trial for publishing Thomas Paine's The Age of Reason, 7 and Richard Carlile's 1819 trial for his publication of the same text. 8 Most recently, it was cited in Salman Rushdie's 1991 acquittal for blasphemous libel, to ground the claim that the English offense of blasphemy applied only where the Church of England was the party scorned. 9 In 2005, Baroness Detta O'Cathain cited the case in the House of Lords, in an argument against the abolition of common law blasphemy. 10 Indeed, even John Stuart Mill railed against Hale's judgment. Mill's attack on the judgment rested on a classically utilitarian formulation: "freedom of discussion has generally, the happiest effects on the mind and manners" and "all religions. . . ought to be subjected to such discussion." 11 For Mill, the law was an instrument of philosophy developed outside legal institutions; where the law, as in Hale's judgment, failed to promote the "happiest effects," amendment was required. Although modern historians have not followed Mill's argument precisely, a similar approach has been common to much of the scholarship on Taylor's Case and on religion and law in the Restoration more generally.
The connected issue is that numerous modern historians, and in particular intellectual historians, have followed Mill in approaching the common law as a subordinate discipline. Principally, Restoration common law has been treated as an instrument of the king's or Parliament's will, and this argument has been made from a source base of parliamentary debates, pamphlets, and longer polemical tracts, such as Hobbes's Leviathan, rather than from the works of common lawyers and proceedings of the common law courts. 12 11. John Stuart Mill, "ART. I." Westminster Review 2 (1824): 1-27, at 9. 12. Although not discussed here, scholars outside the field of history have tended to approach Taylor's Case with anachronistic terms such as "discrimination" (Lawrence McNamara, "Blasphemy," in Law and Religion: God, the State and the Common Law, "confessional state," in particular because of statute law enshrining the Church of England's centrality to the Restoration English state. 13 Using this context to interpret Taylor's Case, Clark treated the case as expressive of this legislative confessionalization; Hale's judgment demonstrated the "essential unity of the two spheres" of "Church and State." 14 Following Clark, Ian Hunter also interpreted Hale's judgment as evidence of legislative confessionalization; as the "bedding-down" of the "Anglican constitutional order." 15 Without mentioning Taylor's Case, Jacqueline Rose similarly spoke of a Restoration "Anglican establishment," which "prosecuted dissenters," flattening distinctions among the king, Parliament, and the lawyers actually responsible for prosecutions. 16 Elsewhere, Rose approached the conflict over ecclesiastical supremacyover who made laws governing the Church-as one between crown and Church, eliding the lawyers entrusted with administering the law. 17 This tendency to assume that the common lawyers carried out the will of their superiors is even more acute among historians of early modern sovereignty. Quentin Skinner, for example, sees the emergence of a stable concept of the state in the seventeenth century as contingent, in particular, on the emergence of an idea of sovereignty as an exclusive lawmaking power held by a centralized authority, a move that he sees most clearly in the work of Thomas Hobbes. 18 For Corinne Weston and Janelle Greenberg, working in particular from pamphlet literature, sovereignty referred to the unique power to make law, and the defining seventeenth-century dispute was between those who saw sovereignty as held by the king alone, and those who saw sovereignty as held conjointly between the king and the two Houses of Parliament. 19 If the sovereign's legislative power was the only form of lawmaking, then the common lawyers and their courts were ciphers in this process, enforcers of the sovereign's laws.
Where intellectual historians have begun to enquire into the Restoration common law, a more complicated account of sovereignty begins to emerge. The most significant attempt by an intellectual historian to give extensive consideration to the common lawyers is the work of John G. A. Pocock. Pocock's engagement with the common lawyers did not treat their legal work as central, but rather enquired into the species of historiography that they produced. Concluding a discussion of Matthew Hale and Restoration royalist history writing, Pocock focused on Hale's "sense of history," which he considered only a "theory, not a vision of history in the concrete." 20 Pocock noted, though, that the idea of custom, central to the common lawyers, was opposed to a "doctrine of sovereignty." 21 As will be discussed, it is not so much a "doctrine" that was at issue, but Pocock correctly recognized that an understanding of sovereignty as hierarchical was not ubiquitous and that common lawyers were its opponents, a point that few intellectual historians have recognized. 22 21. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, 26. 22. Pocock's claim has been echoed by Glenn Burgess, who has noted the early modern contest over the meaning of "sovereignty": Glenn Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the the writings of the common lawyers, we can see that hierarchical sovereignty was not a universally accepted account of law, but rather a particular polemical framing of it that was antagonistic to the common lawyers and resisted by them. In other words, Skinner, Rose, and others have successfully captured a range of perspectives on Restoration sovereignty, but because they neglected the common lawyers, our understanding of it remains incomplete. The Restoration's most prominent common lawyer, Sir Matthew Hale, the King's Bench Chief Justice who presided over Taylor's Case, explicitly rejected the argument that the common lawyers were subordinate to any higher lawmaking power. Responding to Thomas Hobbes's A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England, which asserted that the king was sovereign and had total control over the common lawyers, Hale claimed that although the king held "soveraigne Power," sovereignty entailed only a limited set of powers. 23 These powers did not extend to the control of the common lawyers, alongside whom the king and Parliament worked in the creation and enforcement of laws.
It is through the context of this dispute over the relationship between sovereign and judicial power that I will approach Hale's judgment in Taylor's Case. Taylor's trial was one of the last cases that Hale oversaw prior to his retirement, and was held roughly simultaneously to when Hale was writing his response to Hobbes. The case is important to understanding how Hale's account of judicial office related to his exercise of this office not only because of the simultaneity of text and trial, but also because Taylor's Case addressed the exact question to which the HaleHobbes dispute referred: because offenses such as Taylor's had long been the subject of legislation, and prohibitions against dissenting behavior were expanded during the Restoration.
In other words, Taylor came before the King's Bench at a time when there was extensive statute law against behavior like his passed by the sovereign; an excellent testing ground for whether Hale conducted his office according to Hobbes or Hale's response to Hobbes's Dialogue. In testing the relationship between Hale's rhetoric and his exercise of office, this article seeks first to challenge the widespread presumption of the common law's subservience to sovereign power. Rather than simply taking for granted that sovereignty functioned hierarchically through an exclusive legislative power, it begins an investigation of sovereignty from the neglected perspective of the operation of the common law. It does so through an explicit engagement with the texts of the common law: the manuscript records of Matthew Hale's notes on the common law, and manuscript and printed records of cases heard in the Court of King's Bench.
It will become apparent that consistent with this rhetoric of judicial office, Hale's judgment in Taylor's Case implemented a model of lawmaking as a conjoint function of the common law judiciary, the king, and Parliament, with the pre-eminent role being held by the common lawyers, and no role for ecclesiastical lawyers. In doing so, Hale placed little weight on any notion of sovereignty; the sovereign-the king-was only one power, and not the most significant in the lawmaking process. Hale effected such a model by locating Taylor's offense not within legislative or ecclesiastical approaches to heresy, but within the common law offense of defamation; an offense developed largely independent of king and Parliament and focused on the utterance of insulting words, including words that threatened the state. In this process, he relied only in part on broader legislative prohibitions against religious dissent, which he used as grounds for adapting common law defamation to cover God as a defamable party.
In grounding his judgment in common law defamation, Hale relied only minimally on law created by king and Parliament, an approach that shows no subservience by the common lawyers to a higher office. As he did in his response to Hobbes, Hale's judgment rejected the image of sovereignty as the apex of a centralized lawmaking establishment. Such an image therefore cannot have been, as scholars assume, a settled feature of Restoration England or the battleground on which Restoration debate operated. A sovereignty that held sole lawmaking power and subordinated all lawyers to it was a piece of partisan rhetoric, a particular polemical strategy in the broader war over the configuration of offices, and moreover, a rhetoric that did not hold sway over Hale's King's Bench. Historians have mistaken a strategy for the entire battle, reifying as general a particular deployment of the term "sovereignty," and occluding the operation of the common law courts of England in this process at the cost of our understanding of the struggle between judiciary and king in seventeenth-century England.
In recovering the importance of the rhetoric and exercise of judicial office, this article contributes to the growing literature on early modern office. Increasingly, historians have shown that early modern England was characterized by a "presupposition of office" 24 ; a shared acceptance that, in all aspects of life, from parenthood, to monarchy, to the sun, the world was divisible into an array of offices, each constituted by norms of appropriate conduct, and vulnerable to abuse. 25 this recovery of office's ubiquity has been a sidelining of "ideology" as a subject of analysis, because "office" was the defining category of early modern life and therefore the central component of dispute. Indeed, as intellectual historians such as Weston and Greenberg have alleged that the locus of sovereignty was the defining ideological dispute of the Restoration, the recovery of office against ideology already has consequences for sovereignty; less an ideological battleground than a claim of official organization. 26 This article will consist of three sections. The first section will set out the dispute over the range of judicial office, with particular attention to Hobbes's attempted subordination of the office to that of the sovereign, and Hale's defense of common law independence. The second section will construct the backdrop to Hale's judgment; the legislation and ecclesiastical case law that set out how offenses such as Taylor's were governed.
The third section will demonstrate the way in which Hale deviated from both legislative and ecclesiastical approaches to situate Taylor's crime within the exclusively temporal terms of the common law's defamation jurisdiction.
In concluding, I will reflect on the implications of this focus on office for intellectual history more broadly. The fruits of this approach, I argue, are that it enables historians of early modernity to move beyond the linguistic as the only relevant context by which to understand terms. For if office rhetoric was centered on the exercise of office-on the practice of officeholding-then the actions of officeholders are a necessary context, because it is this that disputants responded to, engaged with, and attempted to configure. This article makes the case for such a methodology, interpreting Hale's approach to sovereignty not only through his rhetoric of office, but also through his exercise of it in the courtroom.
I
Taylor appeared before Hale's King's Bench at a time when Hale was directly involved in a debate over judicial office, in which "sovereignty" was a key term. For most of the seventeenth century, the relationship between judiciary and monarch had been contested, with kings and their defenders arguing that judicial office was entirely subordinate to monarchical office, 27 with notable judges, particularly Edward Coke, denying monarchical oversight on the grounds that the common law required a particular form of reasoning exclusive to those trained in the Inns of Court. 28 In the 1670s, Hale encountered a manuscript version of Thomas Hobbes's then-unpublished A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England, which contended that judicial office had no scope of independence from him who held, in Hobbes's words, "sovereignty"; the king. In Hobbes's account, judicial office was entirely subservient to sovereign office, and judicial reasoning consisted in merely applying sovereign dictates. 28. Alan Cromartie has termed "constitutionalism" these declarations that the arts of common law reasoning were impenetrable to those untrained in them, but provided those with such specialist training a capacity to adjudicate on any subject, including the monarch's power. According to Cromartie, these claims grew out of arguments stretching back to the fifteenth century, which were popularized in the seventeenth century, and are crucial in explaining the causes of the Civil Wars 29. Among other things, Hobbes asserted that "him that hath the Soveraign Power" was "our King," who "is to us the Legislator both of Statute-Law, and of Common-Law"
Hale wrote multiple works on the powers of the sovereign, with Prerogativa Regis his most extensive reflection on the subject. 30 This text was most likely written between the 1640s and the early 1660s, with the bulk written during the 1650s, 31 significantly preceding Taylor's Case and the events that made it possible: the restoration of the monarchy and Church of England, and Hale's rise to chief justice of King's Bench. It is for this reason that this section focuses on two other works, Hale's response to Hobbes's Dialogue and his History of the Common Law in England. These texts were written simultaneously to Taylor's trial, and Hale's unfinished response to Hobbes's Dialogue reveals him doing battle not only with a notion of sovereignty that has animated scholarship, but also with a notion of sovereignty put forward by Charles II's former tutor. In short, these later texts provide examples of Hale's rhetoric of judicial office that are significantly more proximate to the exercise of office under study than his earlier, more comprehensive discussion.
Hale's unfinished response to Hobbes was first published in 1921 by William S. Holdsworth, who produced a copy of Harleian MS 711 from Hale's private papers. Hale, though, wrote at least one other copy of his response to Hobbes, MS 3479. This manuscript remains in the care of Lambeth Palace Library, where most of Hale's papers are now kept, and like MS 711, is unfinished. Although Hale's arguments across the two manuscripts are similar, MS 711 contains extended detail and a more aggressive polemic. I will draw on both versions of Hale's response to Hobbes to demonstrate his rejection of an image of common law judicial office dominated by a sovereign monarch. Both versions of Hale's response consist of two parts, the first corresponding to the first chapter of Hobbes's Dialogue, the second corresponding to the second chapter.
In the first chapter of the published manuscript, "In Caput Primum of Laws in Generall and the Law of Reason," Hale defended the techniques of reasoning wielded by judicial office holders as unique and inscrutable to all others, including the king. In a clear rebuttal of Hobbes's sovereign model of law, Hale never deployed the term "sovereign," or even mentioned the king. For Hale, the intensive legal training of the Inns of Court was necessary to understand the law and to operate within it. Following Coke, who had similarly advocated intensive study as the basis of judicial office, 32 Hale claimed that judges had to undergo a process of "habituateing and accustomeing and Exerciseing that [reasoning] Faculty by readeing, Study and observation." 33 Those who sought to hold common law judicial office without such training would make, for Hale, "the worst Judges that can be." 34 Hale similarly warned, in MS 3479, of the danger of letting those untrained in law hold judicial office, writing of the "harminge" that would arise if men "inacquianted with the institution" of the common law held judicial office. 35 Explicating this claim in similar prose to that of the Harleian manuscript, Hale asserted that only those trained in the common law could work in it, because it was not "indeterminate reason or reason at large" that grounded the common law, opening the institution to all, but "reason modifyed" to its "spetiall object." As a "watchmaker proceedes by a reason accomodate to his art," as does "the shoemaker," so must a lawyer proceed using a form of reason appropriate "to his art," a reason possessed only by those sufficiently acquainted with the law through legal training. 36 In his History of the Common Law in England, Hale provided further explanation of the deep knowledge possessed by common lawyers, buttressing his defense of the uniqueness of their reason and the inability of those untrained in the common law to intervene in its operation. 37 Common law reason involved deep study in and ability to cite and deploy in judgment the lex scripta-statute law created by king and Parliamentand the lex non scripta-the unwritten common laws of England, the origins of which stretched back "before Time of Memory," and the contours of which could be determined through studying previous judgments. 38 37. Given that these texts by Hale were not published in his lifetime, when they remained only in manuscript form, precise dating is difficult. Hale's "Reflections" was certainly a piece of Restoration work, though, because it responded to Hobbes's Dialogue, itself written in the 1660s at the earliest. Hale's History of the Common Law in England was also certainly written at least in part in the Restoration, because Hale referred to the restoration of the monarchy when claiming that the common law had "wasted and wrought out" the "Errors, to do so would be to invite "greate Instabilitie" to the state. 42 Hale's argument echoed Coke's justification of grounding judicial office in those precedents "formerly approued and allowed" as "safe." 43 Given Hale's defense of the judiciary as possessed of unique arts of reasoning inscrutable to those lacking legal training, it is unsurprising that where he did use the term "sovereignty," he offered a usage utterly unlike Hobbes's. Where Hobbes's sovereign appears like that which scholars such as Skinner, Weston, and Greenberg have assumed characterized the Restoration-a supreme authority commanding a hierarchical juridical institution-Hale offered a significantly diminished role for sovereign office. Such minimization was not uncommon in common law tracts: Christopher St German, for example, had reduced the sovereign to only one of six legal sources, grounding judicial office in so dispersed a set of sources that monarchical control was impossible. Hale would have had direct exposure to advocates of Biblical exegesis as the basis for the common law because he chaired the Hale Commission during the Interregnum, where he worked alongside Hugh Peters, an advocate for the idea that common lawyers should rely on the Ten Commandments, "Moses's judicials" and "Solomon's Rules," rather than precedent (Hugh Peters, Good Work for a Good Magistrate [London: William Du-Gard, 1651], 32). As Hale's "Considerations" lacks references to historical events in Hale's lifetime, it is harder to date than his "Reflections" or History of the Common Law in England, although it may have also been written during the Restoration, because it sustained claims central to these other works, like the claim in the "Considerations" that "time and long experience," that is, the history of former judgments, supplied a better basis for judgments than exercising even the "wisest and acutest wits" ( Although Hale agreed with Hobbes that in England "soveraigne Power" lay with the king, he contended that English sovereignty referred only to a limited range of attributes. 45 What Hobbes spoke of was "absolute Dominion or Sovereignty," which although possible, was "rare." 46 In England, the sovereign's range of powers extended to declaring war and peace, pardoning, giving value to coin, raising a militia, founding legal jurisdictions, and making laws. 47 These powers were subject to two restrictions. First, to raise money to fund a militia or send it abroad required Parliament's consent. Second, and most importantly, parliamentary consent was also required for the king to legislate at all; he could not make law alone. 48 Moreover, these limitations on sovereign power arose from the lex non scripta, the repository of ancient law that arose principally through custom, not sovereign act, and that was the exclusive preserve of the common lawyers. In other words, not only was the king's lawmaking power nonexclusive, but he was also restrained by the law, a direct counter to the arguments of Hobbes and his predecessors for a legally unlimited king. As Hale claimed, the "Laws. . . in many cases bindes the Kinges Acts, and make them void if they are ag[ains]t the Lawe." 49 Judicial office was grounded in part upon laws made by the king, but more significantly, it was grounded upon ancient laws developed beyond sovereign purview, which in some cases limited the monarch. Although the king was "Supreame Governour of this Realme," this supremacy was subject to "Qualifications," which were in the hands of the common lawyers. 50 
II
At the same time as Hale penned this defense of judicial office against Hobbes, Taylor was brought before Hale's King's Bench. Religious slurs like Taylor's had long been treated as the ecclesiastical offense of heresy, which had existed from at least the twelfth century, although the basis upon which these early ecclesiastical courts claimed jurisdiction over heresy is unclear. 51 51. The first attempt to legislate on heresy by Richard II in 1382 makes no reference to any pre-1382 statute law against heresy, nor did any of the succeeding statutes against heresy. Records of English heresy cases date back to at least the twelfth century, and although discussed in the previous section, both Hale and Hobbes saw legislating as an attribute of sovereignty, although the former denied that legislation was the only way law that was made. They would have recognized, then, that the first sovereign prohibition against offenses like Taylor's was Henry IV's 1400 heresy statute, passed after a failed attempt to legislate against heresy in 1382 by Richard II. 52 Successive monarchs legislated on heresy throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, before the ecclesiastical offense was abolished in 1641 in the Long Parliament's amendment of the Act of Supremacy, 53 prior to the broader disestablishment of the ecclesiastical courts themselves. 54 The related offense of blasphemy was legislated against during the Interregnum, and the Quaker James Nayler was convicted for blasphemy by the Interregnum Parliament. Ecclesiastical heresy, though, was resuscitated in 1661 when Charles II revived the ecclesiastical courts to exercise ecclesiastical law as it had been practiced before 1641. This resuscitation constituted part of a wider set of statutes implemented during the Restoration prohibiting religious dissent.
Hale would have known this legislative history well. He had written on it in his Pleas of the Crown, 55 and as chief justice of King's Bench, was there is disagreement over when it occurred, the first execution for heresy in England seems to have taken place in the thirteenth century. responsible for determining disputes over jurisdiction between common law and ecclesiastical courts. He therefore would have had an intimate understanding of the ways in which an offense like Taylor's had been defined prior to Taylor's appearance before King's Bench. In particular, Hales's knowledge of the history of legislation against heresy and blasphemy meant that he was well aware of the ways in which offenses like Taylor's had been defined through sovereign act. In this section, I will provide a summary of the array of linguistic options-that is to say, of the rhetorical approaches preceding legislators and courts deployed regarding offenses like Taylor's-available to Hale from this repository of parliamentary and ecclesiastical action against heresy and religious dissent, which he could have deployed in trying Taylor. 56 Richard II's late fourteenth-century attempt to legislate heresy as an ecclesiastical offense developed a language that persisted throughout subsequent statutes into the mid-sixteenth century. Richard's statute defined heresy as, respectively, a threat to the "spiritual" estate of the realm, because it was a threat to the "christian faith" and the "souls of the people," and to the "temporal" estate of the realm, because it threatened the "destruction of the laws" and was therefore "to the great peril of all the realm." 57 "[S]piritual estate," importantly, referred not only to the Church itself, but to its work 56. The attempt here is to provide a schematic look at Hale's available linguistic options, not to provide a detailed or rigorous history of medieval and early modern heresy law. in encouraging faith and protecting the souls of the people. In 1400, Henry IV successfully passed the first statute against heresy. Henry's statute retained Richard II's focus on the spiritual and temporal, defining heresy as a threat to the "faith and doctrine of the holy church," and encouraging of "sedition and insurrection," respectively. 58 Ensuing attempts to legislate on heresy by Henry V, 59 Henry VIII, 60 and Mary I all used similar definitions. 61 The final attempt by a sovereign to legislate on heresy as an ecclesiastical offense came in 1559, in Elizabeth I's Act of Supremacy. Repealing the earlier statutes, Elizabeth established a new test for heresy that required ecclesiastical courts to rely directly on the Bible, the proceedings of the first four ecumenical councils, or any other general council of the Church when establishing which acts were heretical. 62 With this amendment the language of spiritual and temporal threat disappeared; heresy was to be found through reference to these sources, not through the ascertaining of whether the words in question threatened the spiritual and temporal estates of the realm.
This focus on religious slurs as a threat to the spiritual and temporal estate returned in parliamentary legislation during the Interregnum, although these statutes focused on "blasphemy" rather than "heresy." The first blasphemy statute, passed in 1648, made no reference to whether blasphemy was a threat temporal, spiritual, or both, 63 but such a definition 58. "Henry IV, 1400: The orthodoxy of the faith of the Church of England asserted, and provision made against the oppugners of the same; with the punishment of Hereticks," in The Statutes at Large: Volume 2, 415.
59. Henry V's statute declared that heretics threatened to "subvert the christian faith, and the law of God. . . and also to destroy the same our sovereign lord the King" ("Henry V, 1414: The intent of the hereticks called Lollards. Magistrates shall assist the ordinaries in extirpating heresies and punishing hereticks. Penalty on hereticks convict," in The 62. "Elizabeth I, 1558: An act to restore to the crown the ancient jurisdiction over the estate ecclesiastical and spiritual, and abolishing all foreign powers repugnant to the same," in The Statutes at Large: Volume 6, 115.
63. "May 1648: An Ordinance for the punishing of Blasphemies and Heresies, with the several penalties therein expressed," in Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1133-36. was central to the 1650 statute. The Rump Parliament's 1650 statute against blasphemy addressed the preservation of faith-historically treated as a spiritual concern-by seeking to ensure God was "truly glorified," and sought to prevent "the dissolution of all Humane Society," a temporal concern. 64 Although the statute was not cited when Parliament tried the Quaker leader James Nayler in 1656, Bulstrode Whitelocke, who led the trial, relied on similar language. Nayler had performed an impression of Christ's entry to Jerusalem when entering Bristol with his followers. 65 Defending the decision not to execute Nayler, Whitelocke invoked the "law of god," and the need for punishment to address the "preservation of the people and Commonwealth of England." 66 Charles II's ascension to the throne in 1660 brought the re-establishment of the Church of England and the ecclesiastical courts, 67 as well as a brace of fresh statutes against religious dissent known as the Clarendon Code, which sustained the rhetoric of spiritual and temporal threat. From 1661, a series of statutes were passed that required civil officers take the sacrament in accordance with Church of England dictates and deny transubstantiation, banned dissenting meetings and placed restraints on dissenting preachers, and enforced adherence to the Book of Common Prayer. 68 Notably, this last law, found in the 1662 Act of Uniformity was described as necessary on both spiritual and temporal grounds. Confessional uniformity was necessary for "settling the Peace of the Nation," and its absence was "to the hazard of many souls." 69 Focusing on the work of monarchs and Parliaments only tells part of the story, however, because with scant exceptions, such as Nayler's trial, trials for blasphemy and heresy were conducted in ecclesiastical courts. 70 Although legislation regarding heresy was passed through sovereign act, the exercise of this legislation rested with ecclesiastical lawyers, and an investigation of two prominent early seventeenth-century cases reveals an understanding of heresy divergent from the legislative; a first challenge to the model of hierarchical lawmaking. For all the consistency with which king and Parliament created statutes that cast offenses like Taylor's as a threat to both the spiritual and temporal, the ecclesiastical courts offered a divergent rhetoric.
In the 1612 heresy trials of Bartholomew Legate and Edward Wightman, the presiding bishops articulated identical accounts of heresy as an exclusively spiritual threat. Legate appeared in the ecclesiastical court at St. Paul's in March 1612, accused of having denied Christ's divinity. Refusing to abjure his heresies, Legate was sentenced to execution, a process that required the granting of a writ by Chancery and his transmission to the local sheriff. In sentencing him, Bishop John King described his heresies as "contrary and repugnant to the Catholick faith and religion, and the holy word of God," as well as threatening to the "holy church." 71 Edward Wightman's conviction in the same year by an ecclesiastical court in the Diocese of Coventry and Lichfield, presided over by Bishop Richard Neile, demonstrated an identical definition of heresy. Wightman's claims had included a denial of the existence of the Holy Trinity. In applying for a writ from the Court of Chancery for Wightman's execution, Neile justified the need to execute Wightman on spiritual grounds. In Neile's words, Wightman was a "corrupt member. . . of the flock of Christ" who needed to be "cut off . . . lest he should infect others professing the true Christian faith." 72 For these judges, to be a heretic was therefore not to cause any direct harm to the state, but exclusively to threaten the spiritual estate through the endangering of lay faith.
Importantly, the available punishments for heretics emphasized spiritual concerns, too. Although Legate and Wightman were executed, such a punishment was the last resort of the courts. Legate was sentenced to execution only after refusing to abjure his heresies. 73 Had he reformed his faith, his life would have been spared, and we can see an example of this in the 1631 heresy trial of William Slater in the Court of High Commission, at the time the most senior ecclesiastical court. Slater was imprisoned for his heresies and released only once he claimed to be "heartily sorrie" and had asked forgiveness from God and the Church of England. 74 Indeed, the fact that punishments focused on spiritual reform rather than temporal redress is consistent with these courts treating heresy less as a matter of words spoken, but of beliefs held. Legate was described as holding "false opinions. . . impious doctrines" and was of a "plainly incorrigible mind." 75 Wightman was accused of holding "damnable and heretical opinions." 76 Samuel Pretty, another heretic convicted by High Commission in 1631, was proved a heretic not only because he had preached "schismaticall" views, but also because he had affirmed his views "in private conference with another minister." 77 These offenses existed in a plane distinct from the temporal: heretical belief occasioned a spiritual threat, amendable through renunciation. Only the failure to renounce led to death.
III
Confronted with Taylor's words in 1675, Hale was aware of this rich background of monarchical, parliamentary, and ecclesiastical approaches to heresy and religious dissent. Aware, that is, of the history of how heresy was defined both through sovereign act and in the realm's ecclesiastical courts. We can see Hale's awareness of this history in his own notes on the case, which directly address the relationship between the sovereign and common law courts. While serving as King's Bench chief justice, Hale kept a manuscript record of all cases he had heard in the court, kept in Lambeth Palace Library as MS 3478. Unfortunately, many are incomplete or indecipherable, a result of Hale's cramped writing style, propensity to spill ink across his pages, and general damage suffered by the notebooks over time. 78 Although some of his notes on Taylor's Case remain, they suffer from being both incomplete and indecipherable. For a more complete account of Hale's actual judgment, we must rely on printed court reports.
What remains of Hale's personal notes on the case is a reflection on the legislative history covered in the previous section of this article, clear evidence that Hale was not only aware of this history but also considered his judgment an engagement with the history of the sovereign-judge relationship. Most notably, Hale's discussion of Charles II's Royal Declaration of Indulgence rejected any Hobbesian notion that the sovereign alone made law. The Declaration was made in 1672 to provide indulgence for Protestant dissenters and Catholics, and withdrawn the following year because of widespread opposition. Hale dismissed the legality of such an attempt by the sovereign to make law without Parliament, repeating a claim advanced in his "Reflections": the Declaration was invalid for "religion had the. . .authority of an act of Parlement" and so "was not alterable by the kings. . . without an act of Parlement." 79 Hale's notes might have affirmed Parliament's legislative capacity, but his judgment was not an unqualified endorsement of the statute law on religious dissent, because although this legislation played a role in Hale's judgment, it was overshadowed by his reliance on precedent found within the common law itself. Historians have tended to see Hale's conviction of Taylor as evidence of the common law following Restoration legislation that supposedly unified Church and state, and this story must undergo significant modification, because detailed contextualization reveals no such exclusive adherence to statute. Rather, Hale's judgment blended lex scripta and lex non scripta with an emphasis on the latter.
In blending these sources, Hale rejected the language of spiritual harm from the governance of such offenses, a language that had formed part of statutory heresy and was the principal component of ecclesiastical heresy. In doing so, he excluded any ecclesiastical purchase on Taylor's offense. In his judgment of Taylor, Hale eschewed not only the approach taken to such offenses by the Church of England, but also that proffered by Hobbes and others, which insisted that judges simply followed sovereign dictate. Hale's judgment aligned with his rhetoric on judicial office as expressed in his response to Hobbes: judges interpreted past judgments, and applied these in judgments through blending with relevant statutes created by king and Parliament. As well as overlooking Hale's notes on the case, historians have tended to privilege only one of the four reports of the case. In particular, they have focused their attention on Hale's claim, recorded by the common lawyer and later Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, Sir Peyton Ventris, that "Christianity is parcel of the laws of England." 80 But this quote appears only in Ventris's report of the case; one of four printed reports of Taylor's Case. It does not appear in the report of King's Bench Barrister John Tremayne, 81 and a variation of it appears in one of common lawyer and court reporter Joseph Keble's reports. Keble quoted Hale as having claimed that "Christian religion is a part of the law it self." 82 These other reports have not received the attention of scholars, nor have Hale's manuscript records on the case.
Even if we take Ventris's report alone, as has been the tendency among scholars, it is clear that they have conducted their analysis through the isolation of a particular passage, rather than through a holistic reading of the report, because when read in full, Hale's judgment reveals not that he fell in line with the dictates of a confessionalized sovereignty, but that he broke with core aspects of ecclesiastical and statutory approaches to heresy. Where Church courts emphasised the spiritual nature of offenses like Taylor's, and statute law emphasized the dual spiritual-temporal threat that such offenses posed, Hale argued that the only reason Taylor was tried at common law was for the temporal implications of his words.
Hale began his judgment with an explicit claim of the temporal threat of Taylor's crime. Taylor appeared before a common law court because his words were a "crime against the laws, State and Government, and therefore punishable in this Court." "For," continued Hale, "to say religion is a cheat, . . . is to dissolve all those obligations whereby. . . civil societies are preserved." 83 The longer of Keble's reports attributed similar statements to Hale, although Keble's Hale offered a more precise jurisdictional demarcation. In Keble's report, Hale claimed that although Taylor's words were of "ecclesiastical cognisance," it was because they "tend[ed] to the dissolution of all government" that he was "punishable here. We can better understand this division that Hale sought to draw from Keble's reports of the case, which listed Taylor's offense as defamation. Although many cases reported in King's Bench record the type of offense, neither Ventris nor Tremayne listed the offense that Taylor was convicted for. Keble, however, recorded Taylor as having been convicted for "slander," also known as the common law offense of defamation. Although it did not specify offense, Tremayne's report noted Taylor's intention to "defame." 85 This basic detail has so far eluded the scholarship on Taylor's Case, which has uniformly claimed that the case represented the first trial for blasphemy. 86 Although one of Keble's reports and Tremayne's report of Taylor's Case use the word "blasphemy," neither of them lists it as the offense for which he was convicted. 87 The offense of defamation had evolved almost entirely within the common law, with little statutory influence, and it explicitly centered on the redress of temporal harm arising from insulting words. In treating Taylor's offense as defamation, Hale located it outside the lawmaking powers of king and Parliament. Reading Taylor's Case in light of the history of English defamation law further reveals that Hale was consciously avoiding the language of spiritual harm used in statute law and central to ecclesiastical law, avoiding the terminology of sovereign and Church to instead render Taylor's offense in exclusively temporal terms. Not only was Taylor's Case heard in a common law court, rather than in an ecclesiastical court, but also Hale's judgment eschewed the language of ecclesiastical law.
Defamation was an offense in both common and ecclesiastical law. 88 The King's Bench acted as a court of appeal for lower common law courts and heard applications for writs of prohibition to halt defamation suits in ecclesiastical courts. Hale's King's Bench heard twenty-four defamation cases between 1671 and 1675. 89 Across these cases, Hale and his fellow judges articulated a consistent understanding of the common law's defamation jurisdiction. For them, defamation at common law meant using words against another that threatened or caused temporal harm. Importantly, the justices distinguished their practice from the concerns of the ecclesiastical courts, which they claimed focused on the spiritual reform of slanderers.
The clearest articulation of this focus on the temporal effects of word use during Hale's tenure as King's Bench chief justice was in fact in a case not heard in the Court of King's Bench. In 1671 the Court of Common Pleas heard the defamation trial of Sir Edward Lake, a former royalist army officer. 90 Among the justices on the bench was William Wilde, who would be appointed to King's Bench 2 years later, where he would preside over Taylor's trial alongside Hale. King v Edward Lake centered on a letter written by Lake which had asserted that King, a lawyer, had encouraged a client to pursue a vexatious suit for his own financial gain. King claimed that the letter had resulted in a loss of clients. In declaring the words actionable, Wilde explained that the common law "takes care of a man's livelihood and fame, as well as of his life," claiming that this was a "general rule" underpinning the common law's defamation jurisdiction. 91 Although not as explicit, judgments handed down by Hale in King's Bench reflect Wilde's articulation of the common law's defamation jurisdiction. In Phillips versus Kingston (1671), for example, Hale held actionable an allegation that the plaintiff had broken his father's ribs, from which his father died. Although the defendant contended that he had not meant that the plaintiff had intentionally broken his father's ribs, Hale's bench found that it was the defendant's additional statement that the plaintiff would be hanged that confirmed that the words constituted defamation. As the words in question suggested that the plaintiff had committed a "murdrous killing," for which he could be executed, they were actionable. 92 In short, the temporal threat of execution rendered the words actionable at common law.
Elsewhere, a concern with threats to employment was evident in Crawfoot versus Dale (1674), which involved a tradesman accused of being a "cheating knave" who kept "a false debt-book, with which he cheated the country." Again, the defendant pleaded innocence, arguing that to describe a tradesman as a cheating knave was not actionable as it could simply refer to a tradesman selling his goods at too high a price, and that a false book could be kept by accident. Hale's bench rejected these arguments, declaring that tradesmen's debt books were "of [so] much regard" that they could be used as evidence. Further, as the defendant's accusations were spoken during a discussion of the plaintiff's work, the words constituted a threat to the plaintiff's employment, and were therefore actionable. 93 Importantly, the common law was not merely concerned with harm to the slandered party, but also with whether slander threatened damage to the state, because King's Bench also had jurisdiction over scandalum magnatum offenses, a particular form of defamation wherein scandalous words were spoken of members of the nobility or other prominent officials. 94 This jurisdiction had initially belonged to Star Chamber, but was taken over by the common law courts following its abolition. Hale's bench heard two cases of scandalum magnatum, the first involving an earl, and the second involving a bishop. 95 This action relied on statute law that emphasized that slandering the nobility was actionable for threatening the realm. The 1275 Statute of Westminster declared insults against nobles actionable for causing "Discord, or occasion of Discord. . . between the King and his People, or great men of this Realm." 96 Richard II expanded this statute in 1378 to prevent "great peril and mischief. . . to all the realm, and quick subversion and destruction of the said realm." 97 That defamation in the common law courts centered on temporal harm to the slandered party or state was not only affirmed through King's Bench decisions in defamation cases, but also when the justices distinguished between common law and ecclesiastical law. When confronted with writs of prohibition for ecclesiastical defamation cases, Hale and his colleagues asserted that, unlike common law courts, ecclesiastical courts sought to spiritually reform slanderers. In Bedniff & Ux v Pople & Ux (1672) an application for a writ of prohibition was brought before Hale's bench to halt an ecclesiastical defamation suit involving a woman being called a whore. The application contended that the words were "common words of brabbling," and therefore imported no slander. Hale rejected this claim, declaring an ecclesiastical defamation trial appropriate because the ecclesiastical courts held the power to order "penance." 98 In his writings on law, Hale offered a sharper description of the function of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction: it existed pro reformatione morum (for the reformation of morals) and pro salute animae (for the salvation of souls). 99 Although Hale did not use these terms in King's Bench, justices who presided over Taylor's Case with him did. In two 1678 cases, the common law and ecclesiastical jurisdictions were distinguished on the grounds that the ecclesiastical courts existed pro reformatione morum. In the first of these cases, Case 347B (1678), Chief Justice Rainsford, alongside Justices Wilde, Twisden, and Thomas Jones granted a writ of prohibition for an ecclesiastical defamation suit in which an unnamed woman had been called a "whore." In deliberating on the case, Justice Wilde declared that the common law and ecclesiastical courts had divergent purposes, as the ecclesiastical courts existed "pro reformatione morum." 100 This phrase was further explained in Browne against Averie (1678), presided over by Justices Wilde, Twisden, Jones, and Chief Justice William Scroggs. 101 Browne had called Ms. Averie a "whore" and an "old whore," and had applied to King's Bench for a writ of prohibition to halt her ecclesiastical defamation suit, claiming that the Court of Common Pleas typically granted prohibitions in such cases. In refusing to grant the writ, the justices claimed that Browne's slander belonged in an ecclesiastical court, distinguishing this jurisdiction from the common law on the grounds that whereas common law courts existed to redress damages, ecclesiastical courts were "pro reformatione morum." 102 Regardless of which report we look at, Hale clearly located his judgment in Taylor's Case within this broader tradition of defamation judgments. Ventris recorded Hale as describing Taylor's words as a "reproach," 103 and Keble recorded Hale describing them as "contumelious reproaches." 104 Ventris and Keble also recorded Hale as describing Taylor's insulting words as occasioning temporal harm: for Ventris, they dissolved "civil societies" 105 ; for Keble, "all government." 106 The third reporter, Tremayne, did not quote Hale but instead recorded the charge brought against Taylor, and the verdict of his trial. Read in conjunction with Ventris's and Keble's reports, we can see the degree to which Hale was consciously deploying the language of temporal damage central to common law defamation and eschewing the language of spiritual harm featured in statutes and ecclesiastical court practice.
The information brought against Taylor reveals a prosecution deploying an idiom entirely culled from the language of sovereign-made statutes in which offenses like Taylor's threatened both temporal and spiritual harm. For the prosecution, Taylor's offense was blasphemy. The information against him claimed that Taylor was guilty of "blasphemy," of having "blaspheme [d] ," and of having spoken "wickedly, and in a blasphemous manner," and even went so far as to claim that Taylor did so through satanic intervention, having been "moved and seduced by the instigation of the devil." 107 Such blasphemies threatened the "profession of the true christian religion," but also "government and society." 108 That Hale ignored the language of spiritual harm for that of temporal harm, even when Attorney General William Jones's information invoked the language of spiritual harm, shows the degree to which Hale was attempting to bring the resources of the common law to bear on Taylor's crime.
Hale's sentencing of Taylor, moreover, bore no similarity to cases heard in the ecclesiastical courts, and emphasized the temporal dimension of his offense. Taylor was fined ₤1,000, sentenced to imprisonment until he could provide lifetime sureties for good behavior, and sentenced to the pillory, where he was to stand with a paper explaining his crime. 109 Financial penalties were standard in defamation cases, and the requirement of sureties for good behavior reflects a clear concern with maintaining order. 110 Unlike in ecclesiastical heresy cases, the status of Taylor's soul was never at issue. In contrast to Legate, Taylor was not offered the chance to abjure his statements, or to beg for forgiveness like Slater. It was irrelevant, too, whether Taylor believed his claims: it was sufficient that he had spoken them in front of witnesses. 111 This was not a spiritual offense in need of spiritual remedy but, for Hale, an offense occasioning a temporal harm in need of prevention.
Hale adapted the common law's defamation jurisdiction, though, because he expanded who could be defamed. In his judgment, Taylor had defamed God and religion. According to Ventris, Taylor's words were an "offence to God and religion." 112 In Keble's telling, Taylor's "contumelious reproaches" were against "God, or the religion establisht." 113 Crucially, Hale is not recorded as having considered Taylor's offense a threat to the spiritual estate: he did not focus on harm to the Church or to the Church's mission of saving souls. Rather, Taylor's offense had been to insult God, and in so doing, to threaten the state. The structure of the offense resembles scandalum magnatum cases: it was not the damage to the slandered party that defined the crime, but the danger to peace resulting from the slanderous words.
Hale's justification for considering God a party who could be subject to defamation, it would seem, was a result of the legislative entrenchment of the Church of England. Read in the context of his full judgment, Hale's claim, as recorded by Ventris, that "Christianity is parcel of the laws of England," seems simply a reference to the fact that legislation had enshrined the centrality of the Church. 114 This was no claim, certainly, that ecclesiastical or statutory treatments of heresy should prevail in the common law. In Ventris's report, Hale followed this claim by declaring that to speak against Christianity was a subversion of English law. 115 Keble recorded Hale as having said that as Christianity was part of English law, "injuries to God are as punishable as to the King, or any common person." 116 If we consider these statements against the backdrop of the heresy trials covered in Section II, it seems even more plausible that Hale treated the Clarendon Code as granting God legal personality. Previous convictions for offenses like Taylor's-Nayler's, Legate's, and Wightman's-all preceded Charles II's reign, and therefore the Clarendon Code legislation. In the wake of this legislation, Hale had justified hearing Taylor in a common law court claiming, according to Ventris and Keble, that Christianity was part of English law, and that in insulting God, Taylor had subverted English law. In short, Hale's claim appears to be that Restoration legislation had rendered God a character within English law who could now be subject to defamatory offenses. It was through recent legislation that Hale adapted common law defamation-a blending of lex scripta and lex non scripta-to cover this new character.
Conclusion
Reading Taylor's Case against this background of case law, we can see that Hale's judgment was a conscious attempt to align Taylor's offense with common law defamation precedent, the scope of which he expanded through reference to legislation. In doing so, he relied only in part on statute law, offering a vague allusion to legislation, but no reliance on the language of statute. Importantly, he entirely forsook the language of spiritual harm used in heresy statutes and the Act of Uniformity, and central to the ecclesiastical offense of heresy. Although Hale admitted that Taylor could have been tried in an ecclesiastical court, he emphasized that Taylor appeared before a common law court because his words threatened the state.
This reading of Taylor's Case significantly complicates our understanding of Restoration sovereignty. We can now see that an understanding of sovereignty as hierarchical was factional, a particular argument against the common law's independence rejected by Hale in his rhetoric and exercise of judicial office. Hierarchical sovereignty was not, as historians have often assumed, a neutral account of English law, but a polemical position, and this article's recovery of Hale's opposition to it builds on this earlier research, expanding our sense of the ways in which sovereignty could be Hale's, the bench heard only thirty-three applications for writs of prohibition, and granted only ten. 121 Moreover, Hale's bench's encounters with the ecclesiastical authorities were at times characterized by particular severity from the bench toward the Church and its personnel. 122 A possible explanation for Hale's aggression in this area is that he saw the common law as a positive force. He had, after all, claimed that the common law was responsible for resolving the "Errors, Distempers or Iniquities" of the Civil Wars. 123 Taylor's Case enforced a model of official reciprocity among king, Parliament, and common lawyers, with the last holding the dominant role in the implementation of law, a model that excluded the ecclesiastical lawyers, subordinated to the rival common lawyers.
To conclude, I will tease out a particular methodological implication of the approach pursued here. Intellectual historians have tended to approach the study of a term by mapping its deployment, comparing usage among various actors, and grouping these actors according to alliances and oppositions. 124 This practice constitutes, of course, an attempt at contextualization; the location of a term within its "linguistic context." 125 This article, too, has sought to contextualize a term: "sovereignty." It has done so, however, with the recognition that the most pressing context for studying such a term in seventeenth-century England is not the general category of the linguistic, but the official.
The official was the dominant means of conceiving of social position, and its configuration was the locus of rhetorical contest. Once we regard it as an attribute of official organization, sovereignty talk must be understood as eminently practical, with "sovereignty" being a word deployed in service of particular social arrangements: for Hobbes, to subordinate lawyers to the sovereign; for Hale, as part of a wider official network that shared reciprocal roles. The point here is that to talk of sovereignty in early modern England was often to make a claim about the exercise of judicial office; for Hale of its independence, for Hobbes of its lack thereof.
To understand adequately the debate about sovereignty, then, we must give sufficient attention to the work of the common lawyers of the English realm central to such dispute. Given, that is, that Hale contested Hobbes's model of a sovereign directing judicial practice with one of judicial office's independence, the field of battle is not merely linguistic, but also practical. Hale's judgment in Taylor's Case must be considered as significant a piece of the dispute over sovereignty as the claims of any polemicist; perhaps even more significant. Historians must, in short, give greater consideration to the official context of word use, and thus give greater attention to the proximity of rhetorical contest that sought to shape office and the exercise of the offices in question, rather than reifying a category such as the linguistic and conducting their investigations at a degree of theoretical abstraction. To do so is to impose a dichotomized model of theory and practice onto a world alien to such categories. 126 126. On the need to stop considering theory and practice as distinct categories in early modernity, see Fitzmaurice, "Context in the History of International Law," 20.
